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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to propose a completely new notion of complexity of logics in nite-model theory. It is the Kolmogorov variant of the Vardi's expression complexity. We de ne it by considering the value of the Kolmogorov complexity C Thus the values C (L A]) modulo oracles constitute an invariant of the expressive power of logics over nite models, depending on their real (absolute) expressive power, and not on the syntax.
We investigate our notion for fragments of the in nitary logic L ! 1! : least xed point logic (LFP) and partial xed point logic (PFP). We prove a precise characterization of 0-1 laws for these logics in terms of a certain boundedness condition placed on C (L A]): We get an extension of the notion of a 0-1 law by imposing an upper bound on the value of C (L A]) growing not too fast with cardinality of A; which still implies inexpressibility results similar to those implied by 0-1 laws.
We also discuss classes D in which C (PFP k A]) is very high. It appears that then PFP or its simple extension can de ne all the PSPACE subsets of D:
1 Introduction
Kolmogorov Expressive Power
In a formal way, the notion of Kolmogorov expressive power (KE for short) of a Boolean query language L in a nite model A has been de ned in Tyszkiewicz (1995) , by considering two values: the Kolmogorov complexity C(A) of the isomorphism type of A; and the number of bits of this description that can be reconstructed from truth values of all sentences of L in A: This value we denote by I L (A): The closer it is to C(A); the more expressive is L: In this paper we consider another value, the Kolmogorov expression complexity C(L A]), i.e., the Kolmogorov complexity of the sequence L A] of truth values of all sentences of L in A:
In this paper KE is used to refer to C(L A]):
Intuitively, the value C(L A]) expresses how much of the complete information about A is really necessary to reconstruct the L-theory of A: If it is not the complete information about A; then certainly L loses some of the information about A: Indeed, we could then change A a little, getting a new structure A 0 6 = A; in which the results of evaluation of all sentences from L are identical.
So at least the information corresponding to the di erence between the isomorphism types of A and A 0 is invisible for L: In turn, if all the information about A is necessary to reconstruct the theory, then L describes A up to isomorphism.
We can turn the above qualitative distinction into a quantitative one in two ways:
By considering how much of the isomorphism type of A can be reconstructed from results of query evaluation; formally it is I L (A) = C(A) ? C(AjL A]): (In our notation C(AjL A]) is the Kolmogorov complexity of the isomorphism type of A; assuming the L-theory of A is given.) By considering how much of the Kolmogorov complexity C(A) of A is re ected by the Kolmogorov complexity C(L A]) of the L-theory of A:
Both methods give rise to strati cation of expressive powers of logics with respect to a xed nite A: The unit of measure for this kind of expressive power is bit in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity. The rst choice, made in Tyszkiewicz (1995) , is more natural in the realm of database theory, since it re ects the natural intuition of retrieving information from a database by querying it with Boolean queries from L: The second works better, when we want to create an abstract tool to compare expressive powers of logics, which is our goal in this paper.
KE in the Picture of Finite Model Theory
A nice introduction to the nite-model theory, covering all that we need here, can be found in Fagin (1993) . The book of Ebbinghaus and Flum (1995) is also worth recommending. The following de nition is the key one for us:
De nition 1.1. For two logics L; L 0 we say that L 0 is at least as expressive as L over nite models, in symbols L 6 fin L 0 ; i there exists a map (interpretation) i : L ! L 0 such that ' 2 L is equivalent in all nite models to i('): It can be easily relativized to L 6 D L 0 for any class D of nite models, by requiring that the equivalence of ' and i(') The above two notions are absolute. I.e., they do not even refer to the syntax of L and L 0 or encoding of the structures. These (in)equivalences can be proved or disproved by various methods. Some of them rely on creating an invariant of the expressive power of logics.
We will not de ne precisely what an invariant is. This would move us to the next level of abstraction, while we intend to deal with just a few particular notions. But we hope that the several examples we describe will allow the reader to get an impression of what an invariant is.
We will con ne ourselves to sentences, hence a given logic L can be represented in a form of an in nite binary matrix, whose rows correspond to all sentences of L and columns to all nite structures in D: A 1 in row n and column m means that A m j = ' n ; and 0 the opposite. Now according to the well-known terminology from Vardi (1982) , the data complexity is the computational complexity of rows of the matrix, which are treated as encodings of decision problems. The expression complexity is the computational complexity of the columns. The combined complexity is the computational complexity of the whole matrix.
The expression complexity and the combined complexity are syntax dependent, as noted already by Vardi (1982) | this observation is attributed there to Chandra. Indeed, two logics of the same absolute expressive power can di er with respect to their complexity, since one of them can allow more succinct representation of the same semantical properties. The data complexity depends in turn on how we encode structures. This is however less disturbing, because we can meaningfully compare logics for some xed encoding.
Complexity-theoretic measures of expressiveness. From what we have just said it follows that among the three notions discussed by Vardi in his paper only the data complexity is an invariant (for each xed encoding of structures as inputs separately). But this already su ces to create an extremely rich theory. In some cases the set of rows of the matrix coincides in a precise way with the set of all problems computable in some complexity class. The prototype for this method was the Fagin's famous result that existential second order de nable properties of graphs are precisely all the NP computable ones, Fagin (1974) . We say that 1 1 captures NP. On ordered structures many other interesting logics capture certain complexity classes. A large part of this work has been summarized by Immerman (1989) . All these methods, and the area of research they belong to, are referred to as descriptive complexity.
Limit laws are quite a di erent tool for measuring expressive power of logics.
A typical theorem in the theory of limit laws, a so called 0-1 law, asserts that for every sentence of the logic under consideration, the fraction of structures in which it is true, among all structures of cardinality n in D; tends either to 0 or to 1, as n tends to in nity. A convergence law holds i the above fraction always approaches a limit, but not necessarily 0 or 1. A very weak 0-1 law introduced by Shelah (1996) , asserts that the di erences between fractions computed for n and n + 1 approach 0 for every sentence of the logic 1 . Referring again to Vardi's typology and matrix in Fig. 1 , we notice that limit laws are of data type, since they assert certain properties of the density of 1's in the rows of the matrix. But when compared to Vardi's approach, they use combinatorial/analytic properties of the rows, instead of complexity theoretic ones, to de ne the invariant.
Limit laws can be thus seen as another method to measure the expressive power of logics on classes of nite models. It o ers however only 4 levels of expressiveness: 0-1 law, convergence and nonconvergence, and within the last there is a possibility of the very weak 0-1 law. Some other weak forms of convergence laws have also been considered in the literature, but the spectrum of possible results still remains very small.
In the case of purely relational structures and rst order logic, the rst 0-1 law has been proven independently by Glebski et al. (1969) and by Fagin (1972 Fagin ( , 1976 . Since then, many similar theorems have been proven for various logics and various classes of structures.
Other methods. It can be seen that the descriptive complexity is applicable when the expressive power of L in D is very high. Conversely, limit laws apply in situations, when this power is very low. The middle has been so far no man's land. Essentially all we know about problems for which neither limit laws not the descriptive complexity can be used, has been proven by showing, often in a very clever way, that certain particular problems can be expressed in certain particular logics and cannot in other ones. Some properties have become even standard \separators", like graph connectivity, which has been used to separate many fragments of And again each ad hoc method is of the data type, since it asserts that some particular row does/does not appear in the matrix at all. Kolmogorov expressive power. All the invariants we have discussed so far have been of the data type. And it is not surprising, since the absolute notion from Def. 1.1 is of the data type itself. But now a little surprise is that there is an invariant of the expression type. It is our KE, and is de ned, let us remind, by looking at the Kolmogorov complexity of columns of the matrix. (The name KE stands for Kolmogorov Expression).
This notion is in our opinion a new natural measure of expressiveness, substantially di erent from the descriptive complexity and the limit laws. The next surprise is that, though KE is in a precise sense orthogonal to the methods of the descriptive complexity and of the limit laws, it has nontrivial connections to both. It appears that for some logics it \almost su ces" to give a necessary and su cient condition of a 0-1 law, and for other logics it \almost su ces" to detect when they capture complexity classes.
Connections between KE and other methods. An immediate generalization, which amounts to imposing a bound on the expressible information, growing slowly enough with cardinality of structures, leads to a pleasant extension of the 0-1 laws, still allowing one to prove inexpressibility results.
KE overlaps nontrivially with the descriptive complexity as well. Hopes for the future. Many theorems in recursion theory, formal language theory, automata theory, etc., can be proven by applications of the Kolmogorov complexity tools, mainly of the incompressibility method; see e.g. the contents list of Li and Vit anyi (1993 We say that L is a recursive logic if the following requirements are met. 
Kolmogorov Complexity
We recall brie y the main de nitions and notions of Kolmogorov complexity, using notation from Li and Vit anyi (1993). Proviso. N is the set of nonnegative integers, identi ed with the set f0; 1g of nite binary strings, ordered rst by length, and then lexicographically. Thus 0 is the empty word, but we prefer to denote it by : We will use lh(x) to denote the length of the word x:
We often use the asymptotic notation, such as O \big oh", o \small oh", etc.
log n throughout the paper stands for the greatest m 2 N such that 2 m 6 n: computed by a Turing machine M: This means that the two inputs for M are provided on two input tapes, and there is no problem if the second of them is in nitely long. The output is then written on a write-only output tape, and the machine either halts after writing some output, which is then nite, or computes forever. If it continues writing output forever, then the resulting in nite sequence is the output, otherwise the value of is unde ned.
The Kolmogorov complexity of a string x 2 f0; 1g 61 relative to a string y 2 f0; 1g 61 via a decoding function is C (xjy) = minflh(z) : (z; y) = xg:
According to a widely used convention we assume min ; = 1: C (xjy) says how many bits we must add to y in order to describe x uniquely, where the method of understanding descriptions is given by : Let ( ; ) be a universal partial-recursive function f0; 1g f0; 1g 61 ! f0; 1g 61 ; computed by a Turing machine M: I.e., for every partial recursive : f0; 1g f0; 1g 61 ! f0; 1g 61 computed by a Turing machine N there is n 2 f0; 1g ; which can be determined from a description of N and such that for every z 2 f0; 1g and every y 2 f0; 1g 61 holds (hn; zi; y) = (z; y); where h ; i denotes some xed recursive pairing function on f0; 1g : Theorem 2.2. For every partial-recursive function : f0; 1g f0; 1g 61 ! f0; 1g 61 there exists a constant c such that for all x; y 2 f0; 1g 61 C (xjy) 6 C (xjy) + c :
The above theorem, called The Invariance Theorem, justi es the following de nition:
De nition 2.3. The Kolmogorov complexity of a string x 2 f0; 1g 61 relative to a string y 2 f0; 1g 61 is de ned as C(xjy) = C (xjy):
The Kolmogorov complexity of a string x 2 f0; 1g 61 is de ned as C(x) = C(xj ): ( is the empty word.)
The point here is that the Kolmogorov complexity of a string depends on that string, and the choice of the function : Theorem 2.2 says that for every other possible choice the value of the complexity does not increase more than by an additive constant. Therefore C(xjy) captures the intuitive notion of the shortest possible description of x given y; up to an additive constant. This means as well that the complexity is determined \up to an additive constant term", and we can take any universal partial-recursive function in place of :
The above two notions can be extended in a strightforward manner by allowing Turing machines to use a xed oracle R: The resulting complexities are denoted C R (xjy) and C R (x):
Proposition 2.4. Let R be any oracle. For every y 2 f0; 1g 61 and arbitrary nite set X f0; 1g 61 there exists x 2 X such that C R (xjy) > log jXj: In particular, for X = f0; 1g n ; it means that for every y 2 f0; 1g 61 and every n 2 N there is x 2 f0; 1g of length n and with C R (xjy) > n:
The second part of the above proposition is often rephrased as \there are incompressible strings", i.e., strings which cannot be described in any way shorter then the string itself. Such incompressible objects are often used as \di cult" inputs in lower bound proofs of various kinds. Many examples can be found in the book Li and Vit anyi (1993) . We should mention that the existence of incompressible strings can be proven in a nonconstructive way, only.
KE and Invariance Theorem
De nition 3.1. The Kolmogorov complexity of a nite structure A 2 modulo oracle R is de ned as C R (A) = C R (enc(A)):
The Kolmogorov expression complexity of
If we omit the oracle in the complexity, the oracle is empty. It has been already shown in Tyszkiewicz (1995) that the de nitions we have given are correct. I.e., the values of C R (A) and C R (L A]) do not depend on the choices we have made: of the encoding function enc to represent nite structures as words, of the enumeration`of sentences of L; etc., by more than an additive constant. (The proof there does not mention oracles, which are meaningless in the context of databases, considered there. But the proof with oracles is essentially identical.) On the other hand, the Kolmogorov complexity of strings can itself change by an additive constant, depending on the choice of the universal partial-recursive function, so the additional indeterminacy introduced by our choices does not spoil more than has been already spoiled by the indeterminacy of the Kolmogorov complexity itself.
The next theorem follows almost directly from the de nitions, but it can be seen as one of the main results in the paper, therefore we give the proof. It establishes that KE is an invariant of expressive power of logics, or, in other words, that it is syntax-independent to the maximal extent possible for notions based on the Kolmogorov complexity. First, it is particularly important that Theorem 3.2 is independent of the computational complexity. I.e., it is independent of the most commonly used and studied invariant, based on the Vardi's data complexity. This suggests that some problems which are out of reach of the latter invariant can be resolved by applications of KE. E.g., we are able to prove inexpressibility results, like Corollary 6.7 in Section 6.2, without any assumptions about complexity of evaluation of sentences of L: Also, we hope that some theorems having only di cult proofs, so far, can be proven in a more natural way by use of KE combined with the incompressibility method.
However, we should not expect too much. If we remind ourselves that any But the second observation is that even if it is di cult to get new separation and inexpressibility results with KE, we can still pro t a lot from it.
to what extent L 0 is more expressive than L: And this value can be of interest even for logics which are already known to be of di erent expressive power.
With it we can move from a black-and-white picture of the situation we have now, to a full grey-scale one.
The third comment is that it is certainly not the case that the converse of the Invariance Theorem holds. There are several uninteresting reasons for it, and some interesting ones, too. Let us name one of them. Another one will be presented in Theorem 5.1 below.
Let L be any recursive logic and R be any oracle Proof. Let p be a program of length C(A) for such that (p; ) = enc(A): Then the program which computes forever consecutive bits of L A] performs the following algorithm: for each n it computes the value eval(n; (p; )) and writes it in the n-th cell of the output tape. The only necessary observation is that enc is recursive and therefore can be described by a nite portion of code for :
Thus the values of C (L A]) In this paper we intend to deal with some speci c logics: least xed point logic LFP and partial xed point logic PFP, and their bounded variable fragments.
All of them are fragments of the in nitary logic L ! 1! :
We assume that the reader is already familiar with rst-order logic FO: LFP and PFP have been introduced to remedy an important weakness of FO|the lack of any recursion mechanism. E.g., FO fails to express the transitive closure of a graph, or that a graph is connected. The logics we will deal with have been introduced by Chandra (1982) and Chandra and Harel (1980) , in a di erent notation. Both of them allow iterating an FO formula up to a xed point. The di erence is in the form of iteration.
De nition 4.1 (LFP and PFP).
First we de ne PFP; and then by restricting the syntax we get also LFP: PFP is an extension of rst order logic FO; and we present the syntax and semantics of PFP by giving the only formula formation rule of it, which is missing in rst order logic, together with the semantics of this construct.
Let '(R;x) be a PFP formula with k free variables over 0 = fRg; where R is k-ary and does not occur in :
Then the formula fp '(R); R(x)](x) is in PFP over ; its semantics is as follows:
Let A be a nite structure over ; and let A R := S] be the structure over 
Expressive Power of LFP, PFP and In nitary Logic
The following theorem summarizes some of the most important facts about expressive power of LFP and PFP.
Theorem 4.3. 1. For every k 2 ! LFP k PFP k 6 fin L k 1! ; Dawar et al. (1995) .
2. Over ordered nite structures LFP expresses precisely all PTIME properties, Immerman (1986) and Vardi (1982) .
3. Over ordered nite structures PFP expresses precisely all PSPACE properties, Abiteboul and Vianu (1991a) and Vardi (1982) .
4. On arbitrary structures neither LFP nor PFP can express that the cardinality of the universe is even, Chandra and Harel (1980) . 5. PFP fin LFP if and only if PTIME = PSPACE; Abiteboul and Vianu (1991b) .
Normal Form
We are going to present a very powerful normal form theorem for PFP logic, proved rst by Abiteboul and Vianu (1991b) . Theorem 4.4 (Abiteboul and Vianu (1991b) The converse of this theorem is obvious: whatever can be de ned by a formula of LFP about k (A) can be as well de ned by an LFP formula of A | we just have to replace signature symbols in ' by their LFP de nitions over A: Certainly the same is true for PFP, too. The construction of k ; which reduces the question of de nability over any possibly unordered structure A to de nability over the ordered invariant k (A) is a very powerful technique. It serves as a basis for very important theoretical results, e.g., the proof of the Item 5 of Theorem 4.3 is based on this approach.
For the cardinality of k (A) we write k k (A)k:
Basic Properties of KE of Extensions of FirstOrder Logic
The following results have been proven in Tyszkiewicz (1995) , without oracles. However, the presence of them does not change anything in the proofs. This theorem says to what extent the Abiteboul and Vianu invariant k (A) compresses the information about A: It can be proven by a careful analysis of the invariant, which allows removing relations de nable from the remaining ones, and analyzing the complexity of those which are necessary.
KE as Extension of 0-1 Laws

0-1 Laws and Their Characterization in KE
The results below show that the notion of KE can be understood as an extension of the notion of a 0-1 law for sublogics of L ! 1! : In order to present them, we need a slight modi cation of the notion of asymptotic probability often found in literature, to cover those D; which do not have elements of arbitrary cardinality. De nition 6.1. Let i.e., it is the fraction of the isomorphism classes of n element structures in in which ' is true among all such isomorphism classes.
2. We say that a 0-1 law holds for L and D; i for every sentence ' of L the following limit exists and is equal to either 0 or 1:
In the case that kDk is nite, the 0-1 law holds by default. We empha- ; in this logic we can express the cardinality of k (A); as well. Therefore we get C(LFP (1) < m < g (r) (1) (namely m = k p g (r) (1) ) such that the following conditions hold:
(1)) > 2=3;
(3) which follows from (2), and
(1)) = 1; which is obvious (there are only m k k-tuples over an m element domain). There-
(1)) > 2=3: Now, in order to improve u to a LINSPACE computableũ; we repeat the same construction with any space constructible functiong which majorizes g de ned by (2). Everything works forg exactly as it has worked for g | only choosing m to satisfy (3) we have to take m = k p gg (r?1) (1): Now it is readily veri ed thatũ resulting from this construction is LINSPACE computable. Indeed, in order to computeũ(n) we simulate a machine computingg and witnessing its space constructibility on input 1, then on the output it has given on 1, and so on, as long as these computations t in space n ? 1: When nally some step of the simulation requires more space, we know that the output is going to be at least n (by space constructibility), and we output the number of successful iterations plus one. Now, turning back to the proof of Theorem 6.2, we proceed as follows:
Let us suppose to the contrary that k k (A)k is not almost surely bounded in D:
In the division of D; corresponding to the case with 2k + 2 variables, there must be a block D j in which k k (A)k is almost surely unbounded, and whose sequence of probabilities in D does not tend to 0. Indeed, this is so since otherwise either k k (A)k would be almost surely bounded in D; or else in some block D i some of the properties k k (A)k 6 m for m 2 N; expressible in LFP 2k+2 ;
would not have asymptotic probability 0 or 1.
In what follows, in order to derive a contradiction, it su ces to show that there is l such that D j cannot be further partitioned into D j1 ; : : : ; D jm with a 0-1 law for LFP l in each D ji :
Let us consider the function u : N ! N satisfying (1) with respect to the uniform distribution D j on D j : All the properties p de ned as u(k k (A)k) 0 (mod p) for prime p > 2 are expressible in LFP l for some xed l:
Indeed, u is computable in LINSPACE as a numeric function, which means its input and output are written in the binary notation. But the cardinality of k k (A)k in structures is represented in the unary notation, i.e., the length of k k (A)k written in binary is logarithmic with respect to k k (A)k: Therefore u in structures is computable even in LOGSPACE. Thus there is a single formula 2 LFP, which computes u(k k (A)k); the argument and value being represented in k k (A)k | recall that LFP captures PTIME on ordered structures (Theorem 4.3 Item 2). Now it su ces to observe that all the tests p can be expressed in LFP l for some xed l: According to the properties of u; the set of structures satisfying 3 has no asymptotic probability on D j : So the structures in which 3 is true and false, respectively, must be kept in separate blocks of the division of D j : But then 5 has no asymptotic probability in the set of the structures in which 3 is true. So the blocks have to be further split. Now immediate induction shows that no nite number of blocks su ces, and this yields a contradiction, which nishes the proof.
The limit version is then the following. Proof. The equivalences of 2, 3 and 4 have been proven in Tyszkiewicz (1993) , while the equivalence of 1 and 2 can be shown exactly as in the previous proof.
We have just shown that those 0-1 laws for rst order logic which are ac- One expects that theorems asserting a low, but not necessarily constant, value of KE for L should still lead to similar inexpressibility results for L: And they lead, but such inexpressibility results do not assert that some particular property is inexpressible, like the limit laws do. Instead, they assert that there is no interpretation of all properties from some family of them in L; similarly as mixed 0-1 laws do. The following theorem gives an example of such an inference, generalizing the observation we have made after the de nition of the mixed 0-1 laws.
Of course, this is the place where the incompressibility method plays an important role. The intuitive idea is quite simple: we have a family of properties which, if expressible in a given logic L; would enforce C(L A]) to be greater than in fact it can be. We will use the incompressibility argument to prove existence of structures in which this complexity would be indeed so large. In case kDk is a proper subset of N a similar result can be easily proven, in which log kAk is replaced by an expression depending on the appropriate version of asymptotic density of kDk in N:
The above theorem again justi es the idea of considering KE as an extension of 0-1 laws, this time without any restriction of the logic this argument applies to.
We introduce a new \logic" now, rst de ned in this form by Abiteboul and Vianu (1991b) . A Loosely Coupled Generic Machine (GM loose for short) consists of a Turing machine augmented with a nite set of xed arity relations forming the relational store. Apart from standard operations Turing machines can perform, GM loose can apply a rst order de nable transformation to some of its relations. It can test its relational store if it satis es some rst order sentences, using the result in the computations. The transformations and test sentences it can use are encoded in its nite control. Such machines provide a theoretical model of database application programs, which use rst order (i.e., SQL) queries embedded in a full programming language, such as C. The intention is that the input of GM loose is a structure in the relational store, on which the machine can perform some computations, the output of which can be a structure in the relational store again, or a word written on a standard tape.
Corollary 6.7. Let kDk = N. Suppose that for every k the di erence log kAk? C(FO k A]) is unbounded in D: Then there is no GM loose machine which can compute for all A 2 D; given A as its relational input, the cardinality of A written on its output tape. Note the reason why GM loose fails to compute kAk above. It is not any lack of computational power | it can have as much of it as we want. It is the lack of information about the structure. Further note that we could use essentially any query languege L closed under query composition in place of FO k ; as well as allow the machines to create the queries at runtime in the above corollary, and the proof would still work for such machines.
KE and Descriptive Complexity
The results in this section show that surprisingly the area of the KE applicability overlaps with the area of the descriptive complexity applicability. Over classes consisting of structures in which the complexity of C(PFP k A]) is su ciently high, the sentences of PFP itself or of its simple extension de ne already all they could: all PSPACE properties. This indicates that KE for PFP indeed lls a no man's land between classes in which the expressive power of PFP is extremely low (i.e., 0-1 laws hold), and those in which this expressive power achieves all of PSPACE. E.g., let A be a graph, and let A 0 be its canonization, i.e., an ordered graph whose adjacency matrix is lexicographically rst among all the graphs isomorphic to A: Then Q is 2m-ary, and for two tuplesã;b 2 jAj m we have Q(ã;b) i for some 0 6 i; j < kAk;ã is in the i-th class andb in the j-th class according to the lexicographic ordering of ( k (A)) m ; and there is an edge between i and j in A 0 :
Since canonization of nite structures is in p 2 ; Blass and Gurevich (1995) , the predicate is computable in this complexity class, as well. Now, because PFP(Q) de nes over some Cartesian power of A the isomorphic, ordered copy of A; by Theorem 4.3 sentences of PFP(Q) de ne all PSPACE subsets of D:
Concerning the last theorem, it appears from the proof that Q (which can be quite formally introduced to the logic as so called Lindstr om quanti er) is not used to provide any computational power to PFP. It just \pumps" the missing information in, and then the whole computational task is performed without any use of it.
So a similar comment as the one we have made after proof of Corollary 6.7 can be made here: what we provided PFP with introducing Q; was information about the structure rather than computational power. We had to do it, as the following simple example shows:
Example. Let f; g : N ! N be two functions. Let = hE; 6i be the signature of directed graphs with partial ordering of the universe. The class D f;g consists of all graphs G; which are disjoint unions of: a graph G 0 of cardinality n linearly ordered by 6; and two cliques: G 1 of size f(n) and G 2 of size g(n); in which 6 is the identity relation.
Let f(n) = g(n) = f 0 (n) = n and g 0 (n) = n + 1: Then it is easy to see Proof. It is enough to show, exactly as in the previous proof, that uniformly for all A 2 D; the logic PFP can interpret over some Cartesian power of jAj an ordered copy of A itself. Exactly as before, interpreting the ordering is not a problem. Then, having the whole computational power of PSPACE over this ordering expressible in PFP, and also the de nability of k (A) in PFP, the formula we need expresses the result of the following PSPACE computation:
consider consecutively, in the lexicographic ordering, all nite structures in D equipped with orderings, looking for the rst one, say B 6 = hB; 6i; such that k (B) = k (A): When it is found, then by our assumptions B = A: So we have indeed found an interpretation of an ordered copy of A in some Cartesian power of A itself.
The results in this section have been independently obtained by Seth (1995) in a slightly di erent formulation. His results require values of k k (A)k to be of order kAk " ; while we have used an analogous requirement concerning C(PFP k A]): In virtue of Theorem 5.2 our assumption implies that of Seth (but not vice versa, so our results are somewhat weaker).
What Is so Special About PFP?
The question from the title of this section is quite legitimate. We have noticed a surprising explanation of both the 0-1 laws and capturing of PSPACE by this logic in terms of C(PFP k A]): Is it a special feature of PFP or can this happen for other logics? The rst candidate is LFP. The 0-1 law explanation holds. Are the counterparts of Theorems 6.8 and 6.9, but for LFP and PTIME instead of PFP and PSPACE, also true? This is rather unlikely, since the computations we have used in the proofs and encoded in PFP do not seem to be doable in PTIME. But it is easy to see that refutation of them would imply separation of PTIME and PSPACE. Indeed, PTIME=PSPACE implies LFP fin PFP; Theorem 4.3, Item 5. So assuming the rst equality, we can replace in both theorems all occurrences of PTIME by PSPACE and all occurrences of LFP by PFP, getting the desired counterparts. Now immediately we ask if the converse of this observation is also true?
For other logics even the explanation of 0-1 laws may fail, as we have shown in Proposition 6.5.
Questions
This paper reports an ongoing research. There are relatively few known facts, and many questions. Let us present some of them:
1. The Kolmogorov expressive complexity C(L A]) has been de ned as the number of bits necessary to describe the L-theory of A: The Kolmogorov expressive power I L (A) is the number of bits of the description of (the isomorphism type of) a structure A we can learn by having access to the L-theory of A: So I L (A) says how much of C(L A]) is really used to express properties of A; while the latter measures merely the complication of the theory. The connections between the two notions are unclear (see Tyszkiewicz (1995)), and it seems an intriguing question, if C(L A]) can be much larger than I L (A); because it is to some extent a question, how much inaccessible or useless information can there be in an L-theory of a structure.
2. De nitions similar to those investigated in this paper can be given for almost any of over a dozen versions of Kolmogorov complexity. What are the natural areas of applicability for the choices other than the plain complexity considered here?
3. What are the methods to estimate C(L A])? How are they related to Ehrenfeucht-Fra ss e games, which are used in the proof of the theorem in Tyszkiewicz (1995) , mentioned in the comment after the proof of Theorem 3.2? 4. What is the relationship between 0-1 laws and convergence laws on the one hand (cf. De nition 6.1) and KE on the other hand, especially for logics other than sublogics of L ! 1! ? How KE, viewed as a generalization of 0-1 laws, relates to other generalizations of them, de ned by imposing less restrictive conditions on the asymptotic behavior of sequences D n (') for ' 2 L? E.g., such a condition is the notion of a very weak 0-1 law of Shelah (1996) , mentioned already in Section 1.2. 5. It is easy to see that, similarly to KE, the data complexity in the Kolmogorov version (KD) can also be de ned. In the naive approach, if we just take the Kolmogorov complexity of rows of the matrix, we get an uninteresting notion: for every logic able to express in nitely many different semantical notions the upper bound of complexities of rows is 1:
To make comparisons ner than just the trivial one between logics which can/cannot de ne in nitely many di erent semantical properties, we have to compare the Kolmogorov complexities of rows, suspected to be identical. But now it is not more complicated to verify directly the identity of rows rather than their Kolmogorov complexity, which is noncomputable. But there is a reasonable solution of this problem, and the notion appears even to be useful as a tool in proving inexpressibility results. In fact, most of the hierarchy results for Lindstr om quanti ers, shown by Hella, Luosto and V a an anen (1996) , have been proven by arguments equivalent to the incompressibility method combined with (an appropriate version of) KD, as shown by Tyszkiewicz (1996) .
Conclusion
We have de ned the Kolmogorov expression complexity KE of a given logic. Our main intention was to create an invariant of expressive power of logics which has the following properties, unlike those already existing.
KE is of the expression type. KE depends on the ability to express information rather than computations.
By investigating KE for least xed point and partial xed point logics we have shown that we have really achieved these goals.
